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 II.-62 
A (SOLICITED) CALL FOR CLARITY: THE 
DEFINITION OF AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE 
DIALING SYSTEM AFTER GADELHAK 
Abstract: In 2020, in Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the Northern District of Illinois’s ruling that a 
tool that sends text message surveys to consumers was not an automatic telephone 
dialing system under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991. The Seventh 
Circuit reached this decision by rendering a different interpretation for the statutory 
definition of an automatic dialer than the district court. Gadelhak widened an al-
ready substantial circuit court split regarding what technologies the Act covers. 
This Comment evaluates the strengths and shortcomings of the Seventh Circuit’s 
narrow interpretation of the statutory definition of an automatic telephone dialing 
system. It also discusses the potential impact of the Ninth Circuit’s 2019 case, Fa-
cebook, Inc. v. Duguid, which explores the same issue, as the Supreme Court of the 
United States prepares to decide it. 
INTRODUCTION 
Homer Simpson observes the Springfield police arresting a local rogue in 
a back-alley raid. 1 As the officers discard a large collection of telephonic 
equipment, Homer asks about an odd piece of machinery. Chief Wiggum in-
forms Homer that the device is an autodialer, which the arrested man used to 
conduct a telemarketing scheme. After Wiggum departs, Homer takes the au-
todialer home and initiates his own scam by using a pre-recorded message to 
convince recipients of his calls to send one dollar to his nom-de-guerre, “Hap-
py Dude,” in exchange for eternal bliss. The police finally catch Homer after 
his ploy frustrates every resident of Springfield. In the epilogue of the story, 
Homer uses the autodialer one last time to complete a court order to call eve-
ryone in town and apologize, his new message urging everyone willing to for-
give him to send one dollar to his new alias, “Sorry Dude.”2 
                                                                                                          
 1 The Simpsons: Lisa’s Date with Density (Fox Broad. Co. television broadcast Dec. 15, 1996). 
 2 Id. Characteristically, Homer ignores both warnings from Chief Wiggum about the seriousness 
of illegal robocalling, and also inquiries and objections about use of the autodialer from Homer’s wife, 
Marge. Id. Noting that the machine has every Springfield phone number stored within it, Homer acti-
vates the device, causing it to dial numbers automatically and in sequential order. Id. Homer’s antics 
incense his friends and neighbors to such an extent that Wiggum himself shoots the autodialer several 
t imes out of pure rage when the police finally catch Homer. Id. 
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Like all great satire, this episode of The Simpsons illuminates a dark niche 
of our culture, exposing it and clamoring for its revision. 3 Receipt of unsolicit-
ed, machine-generated “robocalls” has exasperated consumers on a massive 
scale for decades. 4 Despite efforts by lawmakers to limit the use of equipment 
to conduct mass call and text campaigns, both the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) report that auto-
dialer calls continue to produce a huge number of consumer complaints annu-
ally. 5 Frustration is so high that there is some bipartisan support for total recon-
figuration of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), the law  that 
governs unsolicited autodialer calls. 6 
Modern technology is at the heart of the problem. 7 When Congress passed 
the TCPA in 1991, telemarketers mainly conducted autodialer calls using ma-
chines that simply produced and called numbers at random. 8 Today, telemar-
keters employ more advanced tools. 9 Modern internet-based call mechanisms 
                                                                                                          
 3 See Michael Honig, 10 Best Satires, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Aug. 12, 2 0 16) ,  h ttp s://www.
publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/tip-sheet/article/71167-10-best-satires.html (dis-
cussing the historical use of satire to expose disreputable characteristics and traits); The Simpsons: 
Lisa’s Date with Density, supra note 1 (using satire to illustrate frustration relating to receipt of unso-
licited robocalls)  
 4 See ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (noting that receipt of unsolicited 
autodialed calls has been a common consumer complaint for years, and that Congress attempted to 
confront the problem by passing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act nearly thirty years ago). 
 5 Id. at  692; National Do Not Call Registry Data Book for Fiscal Year 2 01 9,  FED . T RAD E 
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/reports/national-do-not-call-registry-data-book-fiscal-year-2019 [https://
perma.cc/88LE-DTZ7]. In 2019, the FTC reported nearly 5.5 million complaints from consumers who 
received autodialer calls despite enormous consumer participation on the FTC’s “do not call” archive. 
National Do Not Call Registry Data Book for Fiscal Year 2019, supra. As of the end of 2019, the “do 
not call” archive contained 240 million telephone numbers. Id. The FTC created the registry as a free 
service to consumers, and it  prohibits solicitors from calling registered numbers except in limited 
circumstances, such as when the consumer authorizes to receipt of such calls or in emergency situa-
tions. See ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 692–93 (providing examples of the “do not call” archive’s excep-
tions). The FCC further reports that robocalls and other telemarketing activities are the single most 
common consumer issue submitted for review. See Corky Siemaszko, In the Era of Endless Ro -
bocalls, Why Telemarketers Persist, NBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/era-endless-robocalls-why-telemarketers-persist-n943831 [https://perma.cc/8ZH6-PB7B] (stat-
ing that unsolicited telephone calls are both the most frequent consumer grievance the FCC receives and 
also a primary concern of FCC Chairman Ajit Pai (quoting Will Wiquist, spokesman for the FCC)). 
 6 See Siemaszko, supra note 5 (demonstrating that both political parties support changing the 
TCPA (quoting state Rep. Ryan Hatfield from Evansville, Ill.)). 
 7 See Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMM’N BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT. ,  
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection [https://perma.cc/5W57-
V68U] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) (suggesting that modern technology is responsible for the increased 
volume of autodialer calls because it is efficient and cost effective for companies to engage in in mass 
outreach campaigns). 
 8 See Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., 950 F.3d 458, 461 (7th Cir. 2020) (discussing the type of tech-
nology telemarketers used in the early 1990s); see also ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 691 (providing that 
Congress passed the TCPA in 1991). 
 9 See FED. TRADE COMM’N BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., supra note 7 (demonstrating the in-
credible capacity of modern equipment that can contact huge batches of numbers in a single minute). 
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can make far more calls, target far more people, and evade law enforcement 
tracking and detection far more effectively than equipment of the past.10 Such 
resources have emboldened even legitimate companies and sales personnel to 
rely heavily on robocalling equipment and techniques. 11 
Consumers have two options for relief from receipt of unsolic ited ro-
bocalls: the consumer market, including service providers, and the courts. 12 
The consumer market provides some recourse for stopping unwanted calls, but 
it is highly regulated and making use of its services requires smartphone users 
to pay extra money and have substantial product acumen. 13 Thus, although the 
consumer market remains an intriguing source of reprieve for consumer frus-
tration regarding robocalls, it is unlikely to produce a panacea to the prob-
lem. 14 
                                                                                                          
 10 See Robocalls, FED. TRADE COMM’N BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., https://www.consumer.
ftc.gov/features/feature-0025-robocalls [https://perma.cc/4JJG-YCB4] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) (dis-
cussing how internet technology allows illegal telemarketers to evade authorities). 
 11 See, e.g., Siemaszko, supra note 5 (illustrating telemarketing efforts that the Los Angeles Phil-
harmonic and the Los Angeles Opera use). Once implemented, internet-based call technology is ex-
tremely cost-efficient and users can modify it to coerce or even trick a recipient into answering a call. 
See id. (discussing how illegal call campaigns can mimic telephone numbers the recipient may recog-
nize to induce the recipient into accepting a robocall). Telemarketing has an extremely low success 
rate. See id. (citing data from a division of the Association of National Advertisers, the former Direct 
Marketing Association suggesting calls are unsuccessful over 90% of the time). As a result, telemar-
keting companies may incentivize, or even require, salespeople to use robocalling equipment to meet 
production quotas. See id. (implying that telemarketers may increase the number of successful calls by 
increasing the number of total calls). 
 12 See Mike Snider, Robocalls Could Be Blocked by Phone Companies Under Proposed Rules, 
FCC Chairman Says, USA TODAY (May 15, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2019/
05/15/robocall-fcc-rule-would-let-phone-companies-automatically-block-spam/3678856002 [https://
perma.cc/L6XV-L7A8] (demonstrating how service providers can implement tools that allow smart-
phones and home phones to obstruct calls from unfamiliar numbers); see, e.g., Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 
460 (providing one example of how individuals look to the courts to resolve autodialer issues). 
 13 See Kim Komando, 3 Reasons Robocalls Are Hard to Stop and 5 Things to Do About Them, USA 
T ODAY (May 30, 2019) https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/05/30/robocalls-annoying-but-
there-ways-stop-them/1278242001 [https://perma.cc/MK7U-HNAA] (discussing several popular 
smartphone applications that prevent unwanted calls); Snider, supra note 12 (discussing the FCC’s 
evaluation of some technology that telephone providers offer to their subscribers to reject robocalls). 
The FCC limits the ability of telephone providers to reject unsolicited phone calls proactively. Snider, 
supra note 12. Consumers of modern smartphones often have the means to program their phones to ob-
struct calls, but such capability generally requires individual consumers to be diligent in manually “teach-
ing” their phones which numbers to permit and which to deny. See How to Stop Annoying Robocalls and 
Scam Calls for Good, KIM KOMANDO, https://www.komando.com/safety-security-reviews/how-to-
stop-annoying-robocalls/540682 [https://perma.cc/778Q-87W3] (discussing how a user of each major 
smartphone brand can block future calls from numbers that have previously called the user’s phone). 
Smartphone applicationsknown as appsoffer additional safeguarding, but apps are often not out-
of-the-box features of smartphones and instead require a consumer to research and potentially pur-
chase them at additional cost. See id. (enumerating the different apps available to subscribers of each 
of the four major cell phone carriers). 
 14 See Komando, supra note 13 (explaining how there is still a need for regulation because con-
sumer solutions are highly fragmented and individualized).  
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Courts can supply solutions that the market cannot, but courts are divided 
on which devices fit the statutory definition of an autodialer. 15 The split derives 
from two key problems. 16 First, courts have unanimously held that the statuto-
ry definition of an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) has severe 
grammatical problems. 17 Second, courts have the extremely difficult task of 
determining how to apply a legal definition to technology that did not exist at 
the time Congress wrote the statutory language and that continues to evolve in 
unpredictable ways. 18 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits have adopted a very broad definition of an ATDS, opening the 
floodgates for litigation against telemarketers and robocallers, but also making 
                                                                                                          
 15 See Randall Hack & Brian Hays, Second Circuit Adds to the TCPA Chaos, JD SUPRA (Apr. 27, 
2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/second-circuit-adds-to-the-tcpa-chaos-71708 [https://perma.
cc/9C4M-ZVTQ] (discussing the extent of the circuit  split on the breadth of the statutory definition of 
an autodialer). 
 16 See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 461 (explaining the difficulty of the court’s task due to the ambigui-
ty of the statutory definition of an autodialer and the ongoing advancement of equipment). 
 17 See id. at  460 (characterizing the statutory language as likely to infuriate a devotee of gram-
mar); see also 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) (providing the disputed language of the statutory definition of an 
ATDS). The FCC issued an order in 2015 in an attempt to clarify the TCPA’s definition of an ATDS. 
See ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (illustrating that re-visiting the definition 
was one of several efforts the FCC made as part of a larger endeavor to evaluate the TCPA’s ban on 
using robocalling equipment to make unsolicited calls). In 2018, in ACA International v. Federa l 
Communications Commission, the D.C. Circuit exacerbated this issue by vacating the FCC’s 2015 
Order but not indicating whether it  was also vacating any previous FCC orders regarding the TCPA 
definition of an ATDS. 885 F.3d at 692; see Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 463 (detailing how ACA Interna-
tional abrogates not just the 2015 FCC Order’s interpretation, but all previous FCC Order interpreta-
tions as well). But see Duran v. La Boom Disco, Inc., 955 F.3d 279, 286 (2d Cir. 2020) (illustrating 
the Second Circuit’s view that ACA International only abrogates the 2015 FCC Order’s interpretation 
on the issue, and not the 2003, 2008, or 2012 Orders’ interpretations). Following ACA International, 
courts other than the Second Circuit have treated the definition of an ATDS under the TCPA as a  
question of first impression. See, e.g., Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 463 (maintaining that the instant case 
represents the Seventh Circuit’s attempt to decipher the statutory language of an ATDS as if it  had 
never done so before). As a result, the circuit courts have not provided consensus on what the statuto-
ry definition of an ATDS means. Id. at 463–64. 
 18 See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 461 (noting that the technology that existed at the time Congress 
passed the TCPA fit fairly neatly into the statutory definition but that modern technology does not). 
Although Congress has repeatedly amended the TCPA, Congress has never adjusted how the TCPA 
characterizes an autodialer. Marks v. Crunch San Diego, L.L.C., 904 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2018). 
In 2018, in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, L.L.C., the Ninth Circuit explored whether a specific text 
messaging method qualified as an ATDS under the TCPA. Id. at 1043. Applying new call technology 
to an old definition is challenging because the modern ATDS and the modern personal smartphone 
share many common attributes and functionalities. See ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 696 (identifying the 
slippery slope that exists in classifying a device as an ATDS based on its “capacity” to meet the statu-
tory definition, rather than on its present suitability, because all modern smartphones have the poten-
tial for use as an ATDS, if so modified). Thus, courts must avoid applying pyrrhic definitions of an 
ATDSthat is, those that are so broad as to encompass common use of personal smartphones on a 
universal scale. See id. at 698 (implying that an interpretation that exposes all modern smartphones to 
the statute creates considerable practical problems). 
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personal smartphone usage vulnerable to the statute. 19 The United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a muc h 
narrower view, protecting smartphones from exposure to the statute, but also 
broadening the scope of legal robocalls. 20 With its 2020 holding in Gadelhak v. 
AT&T Services, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circ uit 
joined the discussion. 21 Five months later, the Supreme Court of the United 
States granted certiorari to Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, a Ninth Circuit case that 
also questions the correct interpretation of an ATDS under the TCPA. 22 The 
Court heard Facebook on December 8, 2020, and the opinion is currently 
pending. 23 
Part I of this Comment provides context for the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in Gadelhak by supplying the legal framework, factual background, and pro-
cedural history of the case. 24 Part II discusses the holding in Gadelhak and its 
place within the present circuit split on the definition of an ATDS under the 
statute. 25 Finally, Part III analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the 
statutory definition of an ATDS and discusses the possible impact of  Face-
                                                                                                          
 19 See Hack & Hays, supra note 15 (noting that the broad definition, which includes any device 
that can store numbers that it later calls, engages the same slippery slope application to smartphones 
that the D.C. Circuit vacated the 2015 FCC Order’s interpretation to avoid); see also Allan v.  P a.  
Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 968 F.3d 567, 578–80 (6th Cir. 2020) (illustrating the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s view that the broad definition is correct and that the D.C. Circuit’s holding in ACA International 
resolved the slippery slope issue); Marks, 904 F.3d at 1052 (holding that the best way to interpret the 
statute is to apply a broad definition). 
 20 See Hack & Hays, supra note 15 (illustrating that the Eleventh Circuit followed the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s reasoning in ACA International by holding that the 2015 FCC Order’s interpretation exposes 
every call that one smartphone makes to another without consent to potential liability un der  t he  
TCPA). The narrow reading of the definition holds that an ATDS under the TCPA must use a random 
or sequential number generator either to produce numbers or to store them. See Glasser v. Hilto n 
Grand Vacations Co., 948 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2020) (demonstrating that the placement of a 
comma between the verb phrase describing storage and production and the participle phrase describ-
ing use of the generator indicates that Congress intended the use of the generator to apply to both of 
the preceding verbs). 
 21 See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 464–66 (describing how several courts’ decisions have contributed 
to the circuit  split). 
 22 Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ face-
book-inc-v-duguid/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2020). Facebook hinges on similar facts as Gadelhak and asks 
the Court to decide whether an ATDS under the TCPA must use a random or sequential number gen-
erator to store telephone numbers for later calling. See Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1 14 6,  
1149–50 (9th Cir. 2019) (providing the factual context of Duguid’s complaint). Like Ali Gadelhak, 
Noah Duguid is not a consumer of Facebook, the product for which the defendant company contacted 
him. Id. at 1150. The unsolicited communiques in Duguid’s case were text messages to his personal 
cell phone. Id. Facebook added Duguid’s number to its call system via uncertain means. Id. Duguid 
filed a putative class action in response to defendant’s conduct. Id.; see also Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 
460 (providing the facts of Gadelhak’s putative class action against AT&T). 
 23 SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 22.  
 24 See infra notes 27–66 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 67–88 and accompanying text. 
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book, where the Supreme Court of the United States will evaluate and provide 
a final ruling on the issue. 26 
I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT OF GADELHAK V. AT&T SERVICES 
In 2015, in response to numerous appeals to explain the meaning of the 
TCPA’s disputed phrase, “using a random or sequential number generator,” the 
FCC furnished an order providing guidance on how to interpret the phrase.27 In 
2018, in ACA International v. Federal Communications Commission, the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the FCC’s 2015 Order, 
paving the way for courts to form their own opinions regarding what devices 
the TCPA prohibits. 28 Section A of this Part offers a brief history of the FCC’s 
attempts to clarify the definition of an ATDS under the TCPA. 29 Section B pre-
sents the factual background of the Seventh Circuit’s 2019 case, Gadelhak v. 
AT&T Services. 30 Section C details the procedural history of Gadelhak. 31 
A. FCC’s Definition of an ATDS 
The TCPA proscribes telemarketers from using an ATDS to contact con-
sumers except under limited exceptions. 32 The statute exclusively uses various 
forms of the verb to “call” when referencing prohibited conduct. 33 In 2016, in 
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that the TCPA’s statutory restrictions on the use of an ATDS also pertain to text 
                                                                                                          
 26 See infra notes 89–105 and accompanying text. 
 27 See ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (describing the FCC’s rationale for 
re-evaluating the TCPA definition of an ATDS by re-examining the meaning of the disputed phrase); 
see also 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7964 ¶ 2 (2015) (providing the official purpose of the 2015 Order). 
 28 See ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 692 (vacating the FCC’s 2015 Order); see, e.g., Gadelhak v. AT&T 
Servs., 950 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2020) (indicating that the court felt compelled to evaluate the stat-
utory definition of an ATDS without consideration of either the 2015 FCC Order or any of its own 
previous interpretations). 
 29 See infra notes 32–49 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 50–57 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 58–66 and accompanying text. 
 32 Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., No. 17-cv-01559, 2019 WL 1429346, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2 9,  
2019) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)), aff’d, 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020). The statute’s enumerated 
exceptions include: (1) calls made after the consumer gave explicit authorization; (2) calls made under 
emergency circumstances; and (3) calls made for the purpose of securing financial obligations the call 
recipient owes to the government. Id. The Supreme Court of the United States has since ruled that the 
third exception is unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds and has severed it  from the rest of the 
TCPA. Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2356 (2020). The statute also pro-
scribes use of an “artificial or pre-recorded voice” to contact consumers, with the same exceptions 
applying. Gadelhak, 2019 WL 1429346, at *2. That proscription is not relevant to the instant case, as 
AT&T’s communications to Gadelhak consisted of unsolicited text messages. See id. (illustrating that 
AT&T’s method of communication to Gadelhak was via text message, not a prerecorded voice call).  
 33 Restrictions on Use of Telephone Equipment, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 
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messages. 34 As a result, the viability of claims against robocalling practices  
often rests largely on whether the equipment used to make the calls satisfies  
the statutory definition of an ATDS. 35 
The TCPA establishes three criteria for evaluating whether equipment 
used in a call campaign meets the definition of an ATDS: (1) production; (2) 
generation; and, (3) actuation. 36 First, a device must be able to “store or pro-
duce” the phone numbers targeted for a call campaign. 37 Second, a device must 
use a “random or sequential number generator.”38 Third, a device must be able 
to call the same phone numbers it stores or produces.39 Although these re-
quirements may seem straightforward, courts have repeatedly held that the 
grammatical structure of the statute invokes ambiguity concerning the second 
requirement. 40 Consequently, the FCC has made numerous attempts to clarify 
the definition. 41 
In 2015, the FCC issued an order to elucidate the meaning of ATDS under 
the TCPA. 42 The FCC determined that the definition does not only encompass 
a device’s extant faculty to store or generate numbers to dial; rather, it also en-
gages a device’s prospective fitness for such functions.43 Thus, the FCC ex-
                                                                                                          
 34 See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 667 (2016) (holding that a text message 
fits within the TCPA definition of a “call” to a mobile telephone number); see also Gadelhak, 950 
F.3d at 460–61 (noting that the definition of an ATDS includes text messages (first citing 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(a)(1); and then citing Campbell-Ewald Co.)). The Ninth Circuit agreed. See, Duguid v. Face-
book, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that a text message is synonymous to an actu-
al call under the statute). 
 35 See, e.g., Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 461 (determining the issue of whether AT&T’s tool fulfills the 
statutory definition of an ATDS). 
 36 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See, e.g., Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 460 (identifying that the statutory definition’s source of ambi-
guity derives from uncertainty regarding the function of the clause “using a random or sequen tia l 
number generator”). 
 41 See Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., No. 17-cv-01559, 2019 WL 1429346, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 
2019) (providing a concise history of recent FCC considerations regarding the def in ition o f  an 
ATDS), aff’d, 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020). The FCC updated its definition of an ATDS in 2003 to 
include devices that could call numbers from a database, even if the machines could not store or gen-
erate numbers. Id.; see also 18 FCC Rcd. 14,014, 14,091–93 ¶¶ 132–33 (2003) (providing the FCC’s 
2003 evaluation of the TCPA definition of an ATDS in light of advancing equipment). In 2008, the 
FCC reiterated its position, citing a need to ensure the definition applied to modern devices and pre-
sent trade usage. Id.; see also 23 FCC Rcd. 559, 566 ¶¶ 12–13 (2008) (providing the FCC’s 2 0 08 
upholding of its 2003 expansion of the TCPA definition of an ATDS).  
 42 See ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (describing that the Commission 
issued the Order, despite dissent from two Commissioners, in response to twenty-one submissions for 
the FCC resolve the opacity of the TCPA’s definition of an ATDS); see also 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7964 
¶ 2 (2015) (providing that the FCC issued the Order in response to twenty-one independent solicita-
tions for explication on the TCPA’s definition of an ATDS). 
 43 ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 695. Prospective fitness can derive from modification to or upgrade of 
the device. Id. It seems that the FCC was attempting to bridge the gap between the statutory definition 
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tended the definition of ATDS to devices that could meet the requirements of 
the statutory definition, even if they were not presently capable of meeting the 
requirements. 44 
Many parties immediately contested the FCC’s seemingly limitless ex-
pansion of the definition of an ATDS under the 2015 Order. 45 In 2018, in ACA 
International v. Federal Communications Commission, the D.C. Circuit abro-
gated the FCC’s 2015 Order. 46 In vacating the FCC’s Order, the court found 
the FCC’s potentiality argument suspect under a slippery slope paradigm. 47 
Although ACA International established that the FCC’s 2015 definition of an 
ATDS could not stand, the case did not provide further clarification as to how 
                                                                                                          
and modern technology through this line of reasoning. See id. at 695–96 (noting that the FCC’s rea-
soning was driven both by an understanding that attributes of modern equipment are inherently muta-
ble and that the term “capacity” invokes ideas of evolution and change). The FCC recognized that 
modern equipment is primarily software-based, whereas the statute was written primarily for hardware 
devices. See id. (discussing reliance of modern technology on software-based modifications). As such, 
modern devices are likely equipped with the ability to turn certain functions on and off and to acquire 
new capabilit ies through download or other data-transfer means. See id. (demonstrating the FCC’s 
understanding that modern software-based devices contain functional flexibility that older hardware-
based technology does not). Consequently, a modern device’s capacity to meet the definition of an 
ATDS is potentially transient. See id. (discussing the ability to modify devices). 
 44 See Gadelhak, 2019 WL 1429346, at *3 (stating the FCC’s firm position that a device’s ability 
to meet the statutory definition of an ATDS could derive from either the device’s present or future 
functionality); see also 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7965 ¶ 2 (2015) (providing the FCC’s 2015 Order that 
stated that present capacity is not determinative of whether a device is an ATDS under the TCPA). 
 45 See Hack & Hays, supra note 15 (stating that the 2015 Order exposed many new parties to the 
definition and those parties immediately objected to the FCC’s new interpretation). The 2015 Order’s 
interpretation of the TCPA’s definition of an ATDS effectively imposed the definition on any equip-
ment that could potentially function an ATDS, even if it could do so only through considerable modi-
fication or use of software manufactured entirely independent of the equipment itself. See E r ic J.  
Troutman, Dangerous TCPA Win: Court Grants Defendant MSJ on ATDS Issue but Suggests Manual-
ly Dialed Calls Can Violate TCPA, TCPAWORLD (Mar. 18, 2019), https://tcpaworld.com/2019/03/
18/dangerous-tcpa-win-court-grants-defendant-msj-on-atds-issue-but-suggests-manually-dialed-calls-
can-violate-tcpa [https://perma.cc/63GY-W739] (discussing the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois’s post-ACA International rejection of the FCC’s 2015 Order in its analy-
sis in Folkerts v. Seterus, No. 17 C 4171, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42347, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 
2019)). 
 46 885 F.3d 687, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see also 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7965 ¶ 2 (2015) (providing 
the FCC’s expansion of the statutory definition under the 2015 Order). 
 47 See ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 697 (expressing concern about exposing all smartphones to statutory 
liability); see also 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7965 ¶ 2 (2015) (providing the FCC’s expanded interpretation 
under the 2015 Order). Specifically, the court held that the FCC’s reasoning was indefensible because 
it  exposed modern smartphones to regulation under the TCPA, an unacceptably far-reaching result. 
ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 698. The court reasoned that if a device meets the definition of an ATDS mere-
ly if it  has the potential to operate according to the statutory requirements, then all smartphones satisfy 
the FCC’s criteria because all smartphones can function as an ATDS by downloading certain apps. Id. 
at  697. The court ruled that the FCC’s 2015 Order was arbitrary and capricious by extending t h e 
TCPA’s reach to ordinary people. See id. at 700 (citing to the arbitrary and capricious standard in U.S. 
Postal Service v. Postal Regulatory Commission, 785 F.3d 740, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2015), to note that for 
the FCC Order’s interpretation of an ATDS to stand, it must justify why certain technologies fit the 
definition, but other technologies with similar functionalities do not).  
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both courts and market actors should interpret the definition. 48 Since ACA In-
ternational, the FCC has been working to determine if it will espouse a narrow 
or expansive definition pursuant to the D.C. Circuit’s expressed concerns.49 
B. Factual Background of Gadelhak 
The TCPA prohibits the use of an ATDS to make unauthorized calls  to 
residential or wireless telephone numbers and empowers the FCC to impose 
the restrictions of the Act. 50 In Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that a program known 
as the “AT&T Customer Rules Feedback Tool” does not meet the TCPA’s defi-
nition of an ATDS. 51 Telecommunications giant AT&T uses the feedback tool 
to transmit text messages with customer service surveys to patrons of AT&T’s 
commercial partners. 52 
The plaintiff, Ali Gadelhak, was neither a customer of AT&T nor a client 
of any of AT&T’s corporate affiliates. 53 Further, Gadelhak added his mobile 
                                                                                                          
 48 See Hack & Hays, supra note 15 (noting that ACA International does not say how to interpret 
the TCPA definition). Further, courts are split as to whether ACA International merely vacates the 
FCC’s 2015 Order, or if it abrogates all of the FCC’s interpretations of an ATDS previous to 2015 as 
well. See id. (discussing the Second Circuit’s unique holding that the 2003, 2008, and 2012 FCC Or-
ders are still effective); see also 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7965 ¶ 2 (2015) (providing the expanded interpre-
tation outlined in the FCC’s 2015 Order). Regardless of how they interpret the statutory definition, 
most courts read ACA International as vacating all previous FCC orders on the TCPA’s definition of 
an ATDS. See Hack & Hays, supra note 15 (discussing the Second Circuit’s continued validation of 
the FCC orders prior to 2015); see also Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(declining to consider any previous FCC order in light of the D.C. Circuit’s holding in ACA Interna-
tional). The lone exception is the Second Circuit, which maintains that ACA International only abro-
gated the 2015 Order and had no effect on the FCC’s orders prior to 2015. See Hack & Hays, supra 
note 15 (noting the Second Circuit’s continued deference to the FCC’s earlier orders); see also Duran 
v. La Boom Disco, Inc., 955 F.3d 279, 286 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that ACA International only abro-
gated the 2015 FCC Order, but left the 2003, 2008, and 2012 rules intact). 
 49 See Hack & Hays, supra note 15 (explaining that the FCC requested feedback between May 
2018 and October 2018 regarding what definition it should embrace but has yet to implement any  
changes). 
 50 See ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 692 (identifying that the statute prohibits devices that can dial num-
bers automatically). Congress also passed the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Preven-
tion Act in 1994, to bolster the effort to resolve consumer complaints about telemarketing and to ena-
ble the FTC to control telemarketing activities. See id. (discussing the regulatory powers the Telemar-
keting and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act gave the FCC). 
 51 See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 465 (providing the procedural history of the case); see also Gadel-
hak v. AT&T Servs., No. 17-cv-01559, 2019 WL 1429346, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2019) (describing 
the court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AT&T), aff’d, 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 52 See Gadelhak, 2019 WL 1429346, at *1 (discussing the feedback tool’s function). The ques-
tionnaire also markets an AT&T smartphone application to patrons of AT&T’s commercial partners. 
Id. Although DIRECTV is named as an example of one such commercial partner, plaintiff Ali Gadel-
hak was not a consumer of AT&T, DIRECTV, or any associated business of AT&T when he began 
receiving text messages from the tool. See id. at *2 (stating that Gadelhak is not a member of AT&T’s 
clientele, nor is he a patron of AT&T’s associated businesses). 
 53 Gadelhak, 2019 WL 1429346, at *2. 
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telephone number to the FTC’s “do not call” registry in 2014. 54 Despite Gadel-
hak’s attempts to avoid unsolicited calls and text messages, AT&T sent f ive 
such text surveys to Gadelhak in July 2016 alone. 55 In response, Gadelhak 
filed a putative class action against AT&T in the Northern District of Illinois, 
citing infringement of the TCPA. 56 AT&T maintained that, because they de-
signed the tool to contact only customers of AT&T and its affiliates, the contact 
list must have included Gadelhak’s number due to an error. 57 
C. Procedural History of Gadelhak 
The district court in Gadelhak reasoned that the case turned on whether 
the court could find that a device that could only call from an existing catalog 
                                                                                                          
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. Gadelhak received the questionnaire in Spanish, yet he did not speak Spanish. Gadelhak, 
950 F.3d at 460. Gadelhak believed that AT&T engaged in similar activity with other consumers and, 
thus, brought a class action. Gadelhak, 2019 WL 1429346, at *2. A putative class action is a lawsuit 
that an individual or a small cohort of individuals files with the belief that a broader assemblage has 
suffered the same harm. Putative, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Class Action, id.  
 57 Gadelhak, 2019 WL 1429346, at *2. AT&T suggested that a “typographical” error caused 
AT&T to include Gadelhak’s number on the contact list . Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 461. AT&T uses a 
collaboration of automated procedures to determine which telephone numbers will receive a texted 
survey. Gadelhak, 2019 WL 1429346, at *1. A computer system first tags accounts based on recent 
customer activity. See id. (noting that activity that marks accounts for survey transmission includes 
specific types of engagements with certain identified employees of any AT&T affiliate). The system 
then generates a “gross sample list” of all telephone numbers belonging to all tagged accounts and 
sends the raw data to a second computer system. See id. (noting that the gross sample list contains any 
number affiliated with a tagged customer, not simply the telephone number the customer used t o  
communicate with a customer service representative). The second computer system reduces the gross 
sample list  down to a single number to text per customer by identifying the customer’s primary mo-
bile telephone number. See id. (illustrating that in determining what telephone number to text, the  
system also eliminates any telephone numbers that do not connect to cellular phones). Finally, the  
second computer system outsources the expurgated list  to a third-party broadcasting group, that, in 
turn, transmits AT&T’s surveys to the targeted customers. Id. Both parties agree that the processes 
that identify and compile numbers to receive text surveys are entirely computer-drivenindependent 
of human involvement. Id. Given that the TCPA imposes strict liability, AT&T’s argument that i t  
contacted Gadelhak by mistake is possibly a defense strategy against the case’s class certification. See 
Richard Benenson & Al Mottur, Some TCPA Class Action Defense Strategies, LAW360 (Feb.  5 ,  
2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/755371/some-tcpa-class-action-defense-strategies [https://
perma.cc/AXW8-9D8B] (explaining the need for a unique defense strategy due to the strict liability 
nature of the TCPA). Defenses to TCPA liability, at least at the summary judgment stage, often in-
volve arguments either that the plaintiff authorized contact or that the defendant did not conduct au-
tomated dialing. Id. Gadelhak never provided consent to contact, and there is no doubt that AT&T’s 
text message campaign involved automation. See Gadelhak, 2019 WL 1429346, at *2 (providing that 
Gadelhak was never a patron of AT&T to provide consent and that neither party argued that AT&T 
conducted manual calls). If these defenses are not available, the defendant may choose to challenge 
the plaintiff’s presumed membership in a class. BENENSON & MOTTUR, supra. To the extent th at 
AT&T could establish that it contacted Gadelhak due to a data entry mistake, it could pose a defense 
to class certification based on ascertainability. Id.; see also Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 461 (establishing 
AT&T’s assertion that its contact list included Gadelhak’s number due to a typing mistake). 
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of numbers was an ATDS under the TCPA. 58 Gadelhak argued that AT&T’s  
tool met the statutory definition because the tool had the ability both to store 
and to dial telephone numbers. 59 Defendant AT&T argued that the tool’s mode 
of operation existed outside the scope of activities the statute prohibits. 60 
The district court recognized that the natural language of the statute must 
guide the court’s ruling and that the court’s decision would turn on the mean-
ing of the phrase “using a random or sequential number generator.”61 Although 
Gadelhak argued that the phrase pertained only to the verb “produce,” the 
court determined that the phrase affects neither verb. 62 Instead, the court found 
that the phrase pertained to the numbers themselves. 63 Specifically, the court 
found that AT&T’s tool was not an ATDS because it did not dial randomly or 
sequentially-created numbers but, rather, numbers produced via more deliber-
ate means. 64 Gadelhak appealed the district court’s decision to the Seventh 
Circuit. 65 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court, though it ultimately 
disagreed with the district court’s opinion that the disputed phrase modified the 
telephone numbers. 66 
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IN GADELHAK V. AT&T SERVICES 
In 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decid-
ed Gadelhak v. AT&T Services and provided a comprehensive analysis of each 
                                                                                                          
 58 See Gadelhak, 2019 WL 1429346, at *5 (noting this question’s importance because AT&T’s 
tool could not produce numbers on its own but called numbers on a previously assembled index). 
 59 Id. Gadelhak maintained that the disputed clause, “using a random or sequential number gener-
ator,” only pertains to the verb to “produce” and has no impact whatsoever on the verb to “store.” Id. 
Thus, Gadelhak argued that the definition of an ATDS includes: (1) devices that can produce numbers 
via a random or sequential number generator; and (2) devices that can simply store numbers for later 
calling, whether by using a random or sequential number generator or not. See id. (noting that Gadel-
hak referenced Marks v. Crunch San Diego, L.L.C., 904 F.3d 1041, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2018), to assert 
his interpretation of an ATDS).  
 60 See id. (noting that AT&T argues that the statutory language does not cover AT&T’s use of the 
tool). AT&T asserted that because its tool merely calls numbers from a pre-made index, and thus does 
not use a number generator at all, it  cannot meet the TCPA’s definition of an ATDS. Gadelhak, 950 
F.3d at 464. 
 61 Gadelhak, 2019 WL 1429346 at *5. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at  *7; see also Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 465 (providing the Seventh Circuit’s perspective that 
the district court reached the correct result in holding that AT&T’s tool is not an ATDS under t he  
TCPA, notwithstanding the lower court’s incorrect interpretation of the statutory definition). 
 65 Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 458. 
 66 See id. at  469 (explaining the Seventh Circuit’s view that both its reading and the dist ric t 
court’s reading of the disputed phrase, though different, require functionalities that AT&T’s tool does 
not have). 
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of the possible interpretations of the TCPA’s definition of an ATDS. 67 Section 
A of this Part discusses how other circuit courts have interpreted the definition 
of an ATDS under the TCPA. 68 Section B discusses how the Seventh Circuit, in 
Gadelhak, determined that an ATDS includes any device that uses a random or 
sequential number generator either to store or produce telephone numbers for 
later calling. 69 
A. The Circuit Split on the TCPA Definition of an ATDS 
The TCPA definition of an ATDS is ambiguous regarding how to interpret 
the phrase “using a random or sequential number generator.”70 The Seventh 
Circuit heard Gadelhak after the D.C. Circuit, in 2018, vacated the 2015 FCC 
Order on the disputed phrase in ACA International v. Federal Communications 
Commission. 71 As such, the Seventh Circuit felt free to examine the state of the 
circuit split without deference to the FCC and to decide for itself what the 
phrase actually means. 72 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit closely scrutinized 
four options for interpreting the phrase and noted which interpretive frame-
works previously informed the decisions of the different federal circuit 
courts. 73 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eleventh Cir-
                                                                                                          
 67 See Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc, 950 F.3d 458, 463–68 (7th Cir. 2020) (providing the Sev-
enth Circuit’s detailed explication of four possible interpretations of the TCPA phrase “using a ran-
dom or sequential number generator”). 
 68 See infra notes 70–80 and accompanying text. 
 69 See infra notes 81–88 and accompanying text. 
 70 Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 460. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Gadelhak wasted no time identi-
fying the grammatical source of ambiguity in the TCPA definition of an ATDS. See id. (pinpointing 
the grammatical issue that is the source of the dispute in the opening lines of the opinion). The defini-
tion indicates that, to be an ATDS, a device must be able either to store or produce telephone numbers 
and be able to dial the same numbers that it stores or produces. See id. at 460–61 (quoting the statuto-
ry definition of ATDS as found in 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1)). The definition is unclear as to how to apply 
the phrase “using a random or sequential number generator.” Id. at 460. How the courts interpret the 
phrase is determinative in establishing the reach of the TCPA. Id. at 461. The court recognized that an 
expansive reading could subject unintended technology to the statute, whereas a narrow reading could 
fail to keep the statute relevant as technology continues to evolve. See id. (describing the types o f  
technology that the statutory definition will cover, depending on its interpretation). 
 71 See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 463 (providing the 2020 date of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling o f  
Gadelhak); ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (providing the 2018 date of the D.C. 
Circuit’s ruling of ACA International). 
 72 See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 463 (illustrating that the Seventh Circuit approached its decision in 
Gadelhak by establishing its own interpretation of the disputed phrase); see also ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d 
at 692 (providing the D.C. Circuit’s abrogation of the 2015 FCC Order); Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., 
No. 17-cv-01559, 2019 WL 1429346, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2019) (rendering the district court’s its 
own interpretation of an ATDS without deferring to any FCC order), aff’d, 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir . 
2020). 
 73 Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 463. The Seventh Circuit hinted that there could feasibly be even more 
possibilit ies but provided no further exposition on what those might be. See id. (stating that there are, 
at minimum, four possible interpretations of the disputed phrase). The first possibility is t h at th e 
phrase applies to both the verb to “store” and the verb to “produce.” Id. Via this reading, a device that 
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cuits applied a predominately grammatical analysis of the statutory definition 
of an ATDS, which they held denotes a narrow application of the term.74 Under 
such a reading, a device must use a random or sequential generator either to 
store numbers or to produce them to meet the statutory definition of an 
ATDS. 75 If the device calls numbers from a list compiled and stored via other 
means, that device is not an ATDS and is not subject to the TCPA. 76 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that inter-
preting the disputed phrase as modifying both verbs makes the most grammati-
cal sense. 77 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits held that reading the phrase as modifying only the verb to “produce” re-
quires consideration of factors beyond the text.78 In determining that the dis-
                                                                                                          
uses a random or sequential number generator either to store numbers or to produce them (or both) 
would satisfy the definition of an ATDS under the TCPA. Id. The second possibility is that the phrase 
modifies neither verb, but rather the noun phrase, “telephone numbers,” that structurally connects the 
verbs to the disputed clause. Id. at 463–64. The court indicated that this reading suggests that a device 
would fit  the definition of an ATDS provided that the numbers were fashioned for calling via  t he  
random or sequential generator. See id. at 464 (discussing the second possible interpretation). The 
third possibility is that the phrase modifies only the verb nearest to the disputed phrase and that it has 
no bearing whatsoever on number storage. See id. (discussing the third possible interpretation). The 
verb nearest the disputed phrase is “ to produce.” Id. The court noted that if such an interpretation is 
the correct reading, then there are two possibilities for a device to meet the definition of an ATDS. Id. 
First, a device could use a random or sequential number generator to manufacture numbers that it later 
calls. Id. Second, a device could simply have the capability to store numbers, whether via a random or 
sequential generator or not, and also have the capacity to call. Id. Reading the disputed phrase this 
way provides a substantial expansion to the statutory language because it has the potential to classify a 
device that merely stores numbers as an ATDS even if it is does not use a random or sequential gener-
ator at all. See id. (describing the types of equipment that the third possible interpretation can cap-
ture). The fourth possibility is that “using a random or sequential number generator” refers to how the 
numbers are dialed. Id. The court’s inclusion of this possibility seems largely academic. See id. (not-
ing that no courts have adopted the fourth possible interpretation). Although the court does diligently 
consider and discuss this option, it prefaces its analysis by noting that no court has ever formally es-
poused this possibility, despite the fact that some have previously suggested it . Id. 
 74 See Glasser v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 948 F.3d 1301, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying 
primarily a structural verb-object analysis to reach its conclusion); Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 
F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that the plaintiff could demonstrate neither that the defendant 
used a random or sequential generator to store numbers nor that the defendant used a random or se-
quential generator to produce numbers). 
 75 See, e.g., Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 463 (holding that use of a random or sequential number gener-
ator to store or produce numbers is essential for a device to meet the statutory definition). 
 76 See id. (requiring a random or sequential number generator to store or produce numbers in  
order for the statutory definition of an ATDS to apply). 
 77 See Allan v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 968 F.3d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting 
the Sixth Circuit’s recognition that interpreting the disputed phrase as modifying both verbs follows a 
specific grammatical rule). 
 78 See Duran v. La Boom Disco, Inc., 955 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that the TCPA’s 
exceptions to prohibited ATDS activities hint that Congress conceptualized the definition as including 
devices that can simply store numbers for subsequent calling); Marks v. Crunch San Diego, L.L.C., 
904 F.3d 1041, 1051 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that contextual and structural factors were necessary 
considerations in determining the best meaning of the disputed phrase). In deciding Gadelhak, the 
Seventh Circuit maintained a reading of the disputed clause as modifying both verbs because doing so 
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puted phrase modifies only the verb to “produce,” all of these courts held that 
grammar is not the sole arbiter of the issue. 79 Instead, these courts gave con-
siderable weight to legislative intent and practical impacts in addition to syn-
tactical concerns.80 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Definition of an ATDS Under the TCPA 
Following ACA International, the Seventh Circuit did not need to defer to 
custom or precedent regarding the definition of an ATDS. 81 Faced with navi-
gating uncharted waters, the court began by identifying what the phrase could 
mean and then focused its opinion on exhaustively evaluating the advantages 
and disadvantages of each possible interpretation. 82 The court recognized that 
                                                                                                          
is the least problematic means of working with the statute’s awkward construction. 950 F.3d at 468. 
By contrast, the Sixth Circuit in 2020, in Allan v. Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Authori-
ty, clearly understood that it could not justify breaking with this interpretation on the basis of grammar 
alone, but it  instead looked to other, more practical considerations in rendering a decision. See 968 
F.3d at 576–77 (discussing at length the impact of modern database call systems on consumers and the 
need to adopt a definition that includes such technologies). 
 79 See, e.g., Allan, 968 F.3d at 579 (explaining that the grammatical interpretation cannot stand); 
Duran, 955 F.3d at 284 (identifying that the chief problem of the grammatical interpretation is that it 
renders the verb to “store” superfluous); Marks, 904 F.3d at 1051 (looking beyond the text of statute 
for interpretive strategies). The Sixth Circuit appeared to view grammar as one-third of the strategy 
for interpreting this particular statutory ambiguity, with contemplation of legislative intent being an-
other third, and observation of practical considerations being the final third. See Allan, 968 F.3d at 
578–80 (describing methods of statutory interpretation). 
 80 See Allan, 968 F.3d at 579–80 (noting the importance of the consent exception to the proscrip-
tion of robocalling equipment, especially in determining Congressional intent); Duran, 955 F.3d at 
284 (focusing chiefly on the verb redundancy of the grammatical interpretation); Marks, 904 F.3d at 
1051 (discussing, inter alia, the historical background of Congressional drafting and passing of the 
TCPA). The Allan court was especially diligent in addressing the concern that a broad definitio n 
would potentially include smartphones in the definition of an ATDS. See 968 F.3d at 578 (providing a 
detailed analysis of its understanding of the reduced potentiality of smartphone exposure following 
ACA International v. Federal Communications Commission). The court noted that, although this is a 
valid point, it  was effectively laid to rest in 2018, in ACA International v. Federal Communications 
Commission, when the D.C. Circuit vacated the 2015 FCC Order’s interpretation. See id. (providing 
the court’s opinion that the D.C. Circuit resolved the issue of smartphone exposure in ACA Interna-
tional); see also ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (rejecting the 2015 FCC Or-
der’s assertion that a device could meet the TCPA’s definition of an ATDS based on its potential,  
rather than just its present, capabilit ies). The Allan court held that the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of the 
potential capacity argument prevents smartphones from exposure to the statute even under a broad 
TCPA definition of an ATDS. 968 F.3d at 578–79.  
 81 See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 463 (indicating that the court felt it did not need to follow either its 
previous decision in Blow v. Bijora, Inc., 855 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2017), or any previous FCC Order’s 
interpretation of the definition of an ATDS under the TCPA). The Seventh Circuit decided Blow by 
following the FCC’s 2015 interpretation of the TCPA definition of an ATDS, which the court felt was 
appropriate given that, at that time, the D.C. Circuit had not yet heard ACA International. See id .  
(providing the rationale for deciding Blow according to the 2015 FCC Order); see also Blow, 855 F.3d 
at 802 (interpreting an ATDS prior to ACA International). 
 82 See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 463–64 (evaluating the four possible interpretations of an ATDS); 
see also supra note 73 and accompanying text (explaining the Gadelhak court’s consideration of each 
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none of the potential interpretations were unassailable and determined that it 
must therefore decide which reading is the least problematic. 83 
The court held that only the first possible interpretation, that the disputed 
phrase applies to both the verb to “store” and the verb to “produce,” survives 
scrutiny, even if it does not do so unscathed.84 The court found that such a 
reading does not require any strain or leaps of grammatical logic. 85 By compar-
ison, the court held that each of the other three interpretations requires either 
breaking rules of syntax or ignoring common grammatical sense.86 The court 
                                                                                                          
possible reading). In its appellate role, the court addressed a fairly straightforward inquiry: did it agree 
with the district court’s reading of the disputed phrase, and, if not, did its own construction of t he  
phrase require a reversal of the district court’s holding? See id. at 469 (holding that the district court’s 
interpretation is incorrect but, regardless, AT&T’s tool is not an ATDS under the TCPA). 
 83 Id. at  465. 
 84 Id. at  468. Ultimately, the court was able to find only mild defects in this interpretation, but at 
least one fatal flaw in each of the other three readings. See id. at 465–68 (describing the major issues 
with each of the other three possible interpretations). 
 85 See id. at 464 (noting that the first interpretation is the most intuitive possible interpretation and 
referencing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LE-
GAL T EXTS 150 (2012)). The court concluded that the statutory definition’s basic structural composi-
tion promotes this interpretation. Id. 
 86 See id. at  465–68 (describing the major issues with each of the other three possible interpreta-
tions). In considering the second possibility, that the disputed phrase pertains to the telephone num-
bers, the court found that a reader could reasonably develop such an interpretation only by ignoring 
grammar rules or adding words to the statute. Id. at 465–66. The court noted that this was the district 
court’s interpretation, but that it had to alter the phrase to make the desired reading work. Id. at 466. 
The instant court determined that, because the disputed phrase begins with a present participle (with 
an implied ‘by’), it is an adverbial phrase. Id. at 465. An adverbial phrase cannot apply to a noun here; 
it  must instead modify a verb or verbs. Id. at 465–66. For the phrase to modify the telephone numbers, 
it  is necessary to convert the disputed phrase from an adverbial phrase to an adjectival phrase. Id. at 
465–66. The Seventh Circuit suggested converting the phrase by supplanting the implied “by” with 
the past participle “generated.” Id. at 465. The court noted that, although this added language would 
help to resolve confusion about the disputed phrase, it is not within the purview of the courts to insert 
language that the legislature did not intend. Id. at 466. Next the court considered the third possibil-
itythat the phrase applies only to the verb to “produce” and has no effect on the verb to “store.” Id. 
The court could not reconcile the suggestion that the telephone numbers were the objects of both verbs 
with the idea that somehow the subsequent adverbial phrase only applied to one of them. Id. Viewing 
the entire statement in the aggregate, readers can understand the verbs as occupying the first part of 
the statement, the telephone numbers as occupying the middle part, and the disputed phrase as occu-
pying the last part. Id. The court noted that for this interpretation to work, the reader must allow for 
the middle part to modify both verbs, but for the last part to modify only one, even though there is 
nothing in the text to distinguish the verbs from one another with respect to objects or modifiers. Id. 
The court found that this simply does not follow fundamental grammar rules. Id. Finally, the court 
considered the fourth possibilitythat the disputed phrase pertains to how devices dial numbers. Id. at 
467–68. The court applied a structural analysis to determine that the phrase must pertain to all, not 
merely to some, of the language prior to it. See id. at 468 (noting that when a comma separates a mod-
ifying phrase from several forgoing objects, that construction indicates that the phrase modifies all of 
those objects, not just the one closest to the comma, and referencing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., IN-
TERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 67–68 (2016)). 
The court concluded that the use of commas to construct the statement as a group of smaller clauses 
does not permit the reader to apply the disputed clause to a phrase that comes after it  in the text. Id.  
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found that the primary disadvantage of the first interpretation was that it poten-
tially rendered the verb to “store” unnecessary.87 Although certainly a notewor-
thy problem, the court held that this was not of the same egregious scale and 
weight as usurping the fundamental rules of language and grammar. 88 
III. THE CALL FOR CLARITY: CHARACTERIZING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S 
INTERPRETATION AND PREPARING FOR POSSIBLE PREEMPTION 
In 2020, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit established, in Gadelhak v. AT&T Services, that it preferred a strictly tex-
tualist interpretation of the TCPA’s definition of an ATDS rather than a reading 
centered on legislative intent. 89 Section A of this Part discusses the strengths 
and weaknesses of the Seventh Circuit’s interpretive strategy in Gadelhak.90 
Section B analyzes the implications of Gadelhak on the United States Supreme 
Court’s possible interpretations of the statutory definition of an ATDS in the 
pending 2020 Ninth Circuit case, Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid.91 
A. Merits and Shortcomings of the Seventh Circuit’s Textualist Reading 
Gadelhak established that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit is firmly committed to a textualist approach to the interpretation of 
the TCPA’s definition of an ATDS, joining the United States Courts of Appeals 
for the Third and Eleventh Circuits. 92 Although a textualist approach has merit, 
                                                                                                          
 87 See id. at  464 (noting that “number stor[age]” seems inconsistent with the functionality of a 
“number generator” (emphasis added) (quoting Pinkus v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 927, 
938 (N.D. Ill. 2018))). The court evaluated this issue from two distinct vantage points. See id. at 464–
65 (evaluating from both a grammatical and a linguistic perspective). First, there is the purely gram-
matical perspective, from which the court discusses whether “storing” numbers is even a task that 
random or sequential number generators are capable of doing. Id. The court finds plausibility in this, 
given that there is a considerable time delay between number generating and number calling in some 
devices. Id. at  465. Such a protocol requires some form of “storage,” even  if  o nly in  t he  n on-
conventional sense of the term. Id. Second, there is the linguistic perspective, from which the court 
evaluates the plaintiff’s argument that this interpretation does not require use of the verb to “store” in 
any way. Id. The court concedes that as a possibility, but also recognizes that the legislature could 
have intended some amount of verbosity in an attempt to apply the definition to the gamut of technol-
ogies. Id. 
 88 See id. at  468 (holding that the first  interpretation is the least problematic reading). 
 89 See 950 F.3d 458, 464–68 (7th Cir. 2020) (illustrating the Seventh Circuit’s method of precise 
grammatical analysis when considering the ambiguity within the TCPA’s definition of an ATDS). 
 90 See infra notes 92–102 and accompanying text. 
 91 See infra notes 103–105 and accompanying text. 
 92 See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 464–68 (focusing on the grammatical structure of the statutory defi-
nition of an ATDS); see also Glasser v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 948 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 
2020) (stating that the disputed phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” modifies 
both the verb “to store” and the verb “to produce”); Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116, 119 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (deciding to maintain its traditional position that the disputed phrase applies both to num-
ber generation and number storage). In Gadelhak, the Seventh Circuit committed to a purely textualist 
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rigid loyalty to such a strategy here produces results that neither properly ef-
fectuate the original intent of the legislature nor evolve as societal demands  
require. 93 By comparison, the circuit courts that apply an originalist framework 
can address two key rationales of the discussion that the textualist interpreta-
tions largely disregard. 94 First, the originalist reading more convincingly en-
gages the TCPA’s exceptions to the prohibited use of an ATDS. 95 Second, the 
                                                                                                          
methodology. See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 464–68 (analyzing the possible technical interpretations of 
the phrase “using a random or sequential number generator”). The analytical approach of the Gadel-
hak opinion revealed that the court viewed the interpretation of the disputed phrase as a purely gram-
matical exercise, and almost all of the analysis is devoted to a punctilious review of the text. See id. 
(evaluating the grammatical readings of the text). The Third and Eleventh Circuits, however, would 
not be as content with a primarily textualist analysis, such as the Seventh Circuit’s in Gadelhak. See 
Glasser, 948 F.3d at 1309–10 (recognizing the issues with an expansive interpretation); Dominguez, 
894 F.3d at 119–20 (focusing on the present capacity issue of ACA International v. FCC). To  th e 
contrary, the Eleventh Circuit in particular seemed far more concerned about the limitless reach that a 
broad interpretation of the disputed phrase would imbue upon the statutory definition than was the 
Seventh Circuit. See Glasser, 948 F.3d at 1309–10 (referencing the same concerns the D.C. Circuit 
expressed in ACA International, as well as First Amendment concerns).  
 93 See Marks v. Crunch San Diego, L.L.C., 904 F.3d 1041, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that a 
strict evaluation of the statutory language cannot generate a satisfactory outcome, and that other inter-
pretive methods are necessary). Congress has never changed the statutory language defining an auto-
dialer under the TCPA. Id. at  1045. Congress has, however, granted exemptions to some specif ic  
types of activities that the statutory definition would otherwise cover, such as the use of robocalling 
equipment to conduct mass outreach campaigns to individuals who had previously given permission. 
Id. at 1051. The implication is that if Congress had intended the definition to be extremely narrow, 
and if Congress was steadfast in its opinion that the text is incontrovertible in its authority, Congress 
would likely have amended the statutory definition as exemptions to it developed. See id. (noting that 
the presence of exemptions in the TCPA suggests that a device that can simply call numbers from a 
database fits the definition of an ATDS). Moreover, if such were the case, Congress almost certainly 
would have amended a statutory definition that is inextricably entwined with rapidly developing tech-
nology at least once over the course of almost thirty years. See id. at 1051–52 (reasoning that the fact 
that Congress added exceptions to the TCPA without changing the definition of an ATDS suggests 
that Congress felt that the correct reading was the broad interpretation, not the narrow one). 
 94 Compare Duran v. La Boom Disco, Inc., 955 F.3d 279, 284–85 (2d Cir. 2020) (discussing both 
the exceptions to which the ATDS proscriptions do not apply, and the fact that the textualist interpre-
tation renders the verb to “store” unnecessary), with Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 460–65 (discussing the 
exception issue for the most part as ancillary to grammatical concerns and largely sidestepping the 
point about reducing the verb to “store” to a useless redundancy). 
 95 See Marks, 904 F.3d at 1052 (illustrating the court’s view that Congress’s inclusion of excep-
tions in the TCPA, without amending the definition of an ATDS, suggests that the definition, when 
properly read, allows for such exceptions). Specifically, the statute permits the use of an ATDS under 
emergency circumstances or when the intended recipient of a call has explicitly authorized contact. Id. 
at 1045. In 2015, Congress provided a third exception via the Bipartisan Budget Act, which permitted 
use of an ATDS to dial numbers where the intended call recipient owed a monetary balance to the 
federal government. See Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2019) (providing a 
brief history of this third exception). The Supreme Court of the United States has severed this excep-
tion from the rest of the TCPA as an unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment because 
the exception gives preference to speech related to the repayment of financial obligations over other 
types of speech. See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2356 (2020) (ruling on 
the debt collection exception on free speech grounds). Both sides of the circuit split agree that if use of 
a random or sequential number generator modifies both “store” and “produce,” a device would meet 
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originalist interpretation provides a clearly discernable function to the verb to 
“store,” whereas the textualist reading renders the verb effectively meaning-
less. 96 
                                                                                                          
the statutory definition of ATDS so long as it  uses a generator to conduct either of those tasks. See, 
e.g., Allan v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 968 F.3d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 2020) (discussing the 
implications of such a reading if it applies to devices that store numbers without a number generator); 
Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 468 (noting the court’s opinion that the statutory definition engages e it her 
number storage or production). If this is true, it  is unclear why the exceptions are necessary.  S ee  
Marks, 904 F.3d at 1051–52 (providing a brief history of the exceptions and noting that, despite the 
need for exceptions, Congress has not amended the actual TCPA definition of an ATDS). Critical to 
the functioning of any law is Congress’s ability to amend it to suit changing circumstances and con-
siderations and for the law to remain clear such that judicial interpretation is not always necessary. See 
Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 8–9 
(1954) (reiterating that Congress is in a more suitable position than the judiciary to adapt to changing 
circumstances). Pursuant to these goals, a reading of the definition of an ATDS must give weight to 
the exceptions. See Marks, 904 F.3d at 1052 (reasoning that because Congress added the exceptions 
but did not simultaneously amend the definition of an ATDS, Congress intended the exceptions to 
work within the framework of the TCPA’s original language as well as the FCC’s interpretation of it). 
Numbers of individuals contacted in emergencies or who have previously consented to contact are not 
randomly or sequentially compiled, nor would such numbers be stored using a generator. See id. at  
1051 (illustrating the practical non sequitur of contacting a targeted demographic using a random or 
sequential call technique). Agencies compile these numbers independent of a generator; the numbers 
are a sub-category of the agency’s total call campaign, distilled from the larger volume of numbers by 
a process that is anything but random or sequential. Id. at 1051 n.7. Further, originalist interpretations 
question whether producing numbers with a random or sequential generator and storing them are  
separate processes. See Duran, 955 F.3d at 284 (suggesting the practical assumption that a number 
generator would store the same numbers it produces). If a generator produces a number, the generator 
must store the number in some capacity, even if the generator immediately queues the number fo r 
calling. Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 464. This is fundamental to the argument that it is unnecessary for the 
statute to include both producing numbers using a random or sequential generator and storing num-
bers by the same method. See Duran, 955 F.3d at 284 (discussing how the textualist reading of an 
ATDS eliminates the need to include the word “store” in the statutory definition). The textualist re-
sponse notes only that generators sometimes hold numbers queued for calling for prolonged periods of 
time and that such activity represents a form of storage. See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 464–65 (giving 
examples of machines that store for extended periods before calling). Thus, for an interpretation of the 
statutory definition of an ATDS to grant proper consideration to the exceptions, the interpretation 
must concede that Congress intended for a device that stores numbers without the use of a number 
generator to fit within the definition of an ATDS. See Marks, 904 F.3d at 1051–52 (discussing the 
implications of Congress choosing to add the exceptions but choosing not to amend the statutory defi-
nition). 
 96 Duran, 955 F.3d at 284. There is a question as to whether a random or sequential number gen-
erator is even capable of storing numbers in the manner the legislature envisioned in enacting t he  
statute. See Allan, 968 F.3d at 572 (noting that it is difficult to understand how a device used to gener-
ate numbers could also store them) (quoting Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 464)). The Seventh Circuit ad-
dressed this question in Gadelhak by posing the hypothetical yet realistic scenario where the period 
between the generator producing a number and actually calling the number is prolonged in duration, 
requiring the device to store the number in some fashion. Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 465. In so doing, the 
Gadelhak court failed to consider that the question does not really engage an issue of fact; rather, it is 
primarily rhetorical. Allan, 968 F.3d at 572–73. The point in raising the question is to illustrate that 
the words “generator” and “produce” relate to the same basic functionality of creation; storage is an 
altogether different concept. Id. Thus, it makes perfect etymological sense for the disputed phrase to 
apply only to “produce,” even if the manner in which it does so does not conform perfectly to the rules 
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Although an originalist reading engages these rationales more compel-
lingly than a textualist reading, neither model persuasively distinguishes an 
ATDS from modern smartphones.97 The potential exposure of smartphones to 
                                                                                                          
of grammar. Id. Further, even if a generator can store numbers, it seems far more likely that the device 
would store the numbers it actually generated, rather than numbers it imported from an ex tern al 
source, such as manually-compiled lists of numbers selected for calling. See Duran, 955 F.3d at 284 
(noting that it makes sense that a device that produces numbers could also store them in some way); 
see also Allan, 968 F.3d at 573 (explaining that if a generator is capable of storage, it would do so as a 
complementary process to the device’s primary purpose). The textualist response to these problems is 
to suggest that the legislature recognized the highly technical nature of robocalling and intentionally 
included unnecessary synonyms to ensure the statutory definition applied to the breadth of available 
technologies. See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 465 (noting that including extra words can be indicative of a 
cover-all-bases approach); Glasser, 948 F.3d at 1307 (same). “Sometimes drafters do repeat them-
selves and do include words that add nothing of substance, either out of a flawed sense of style or to 
engage in the ill-conceived but lamentably common belt-and-suspenders approach.” Gadelhak, 950 
F.3d at 465 (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 85, at 176–77). Although this point is well-
founded, it  fails to resolve the key practical question: does the TCPA target the act of storing numbers 
for an en-masse call campaign or does it merely target the use of a generator to do so? See Allan, 968 
F.3d at 573 (giving a hypothetical example of how an autodialer can avoid the Seventh Circuit’s defi-
nition). The question of targeting exposes a significant weakness of the textualist approach. Id. If a 
device can mass produce, mass store, and mass call numbers, but does not utilize a generator to do so, 
the textualist  reading holds that such a device is not an ATDS; thus, the TCPA does not prohibit  its 
use. Id. Congress passed the TCPA to safeguard the privacy of domiciliary telephone consumers. See 
Duguid, 926 F.3d at 1149 (noting the legislative purpose of the  TCPA); see a lso  Howard E .  
Berkenblit , Can Those Telemarketing Machines Keep Calling Me?—The Telephone Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 1991 After Moser v. FCC, 36 B.C. L. REV. 85, 95–96 (1994) (noting that Congress 
passed the TCPA to protect against several intrusions to personal privacy and personal safety, includ-
ing usurpation of answering machine resources and tying up of telephone lines during emergencies). 
The textualist reading provides a safe harbor for telemarketers to the detriment of both consumers and 
the TCPA. See Allan, 968 F.3d at 573 (noting that under the textualist  reading, an actor engaged in 
robocalling could avoid liability under the TCPA simply by using two different systems: one to gener-
ate numbers and one to house and call them). 
 97 Compare Allan, 968 F.3d at 578 (discussing how the key issue is whether the device specifical-
ly operates as an autodialer), with Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 467 (explaining the practical impact of the 
broader interpretation, which exposes smartphones to the statute), and Glasser, 948 F.3d at 1309–10 
(offering an additional example of voice activation technology, such as Siri, Alexa, and Cortana, plac-
ing calls that the broad definition would cover). Admittedly, this is a difficult  problem, though the 
courts agree that they must resolve it for the TCPA to remain effective against contemporary robocal-
ling techniques. See, e.g., Allan, 968 F.3d at 578 (noting the significant role that the evolution of tech-
nology has in determining the best interpretation of the statutory definition). The FCC has also faced 
frustration in clarifying the definition. See Marks, 904 F.3d at 1045–46 (demonstrating the FCC’s 
repeated efforts to clarify the definition). In ACA International v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion, in 2018, the D.C. Circuit made it  clear that it  was concerned both that the 2015 FCC Order’s 
interpretation had the potential for devastating overreach to individual consumers and, also, that the 
FCC had attempted to skirt that issue by playing to proponents of both sides of the discussion. See 885 
F.3d at 702–03 (holding that the FCC’s position was untenable because it  simultaneously adopted 
contrary positions on what the statutory definition means). In rendering its opinion in ACA Interntion-
al, the D.C. Circuit was particularly cautious of the fact that the FCC’s 2015 Order simultaneously 
maintained that an ATDS was both any device that uses a random or sequential generator to produce 
numbers, and also any device that could use a non-generator-manufactured list. See id. (taking issue 
with the FCC for not directly resolving the question of what functionality defines an ATDS). To the 
D.C. Circuit , and to the average person unfamiliar with the technical workings of autodialers, these 
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the statute is a slippery slope. 98 Thus, the textualist approach is far safer as the 
scope of its narrow definition extends only to devices that are autodialers in the 
most conventional sense, sparing personal smartphones from liability. 99 The 
originalist response often cites back to the D.C. Circuit’s 2018 decision in ACA 
International v. Federal Communications Commission and holds that a modern 
smartphone is not an ATDS solely because it does not have the innate ability to 
contact numbers it stores without human involvement. 100 Although this  ap-
proach allows the statute to extend to modern robocalling devices, it has the 
potential to be overly dismissive of an issue with such highly technical consid-
erations. 101 Further, the approach fails to characterize and evaluate presently-
                                                                                                          
seem like contrary characteristics and, thus, the 2015 FCC Order fails to provide clarity on this issue. 
See id. (noting that the D.C. Circuit vacated the 2015 FCC Order partly because the Order sanctioned 
two contradictory interpretations of the statutory definition of an ATDS). 
 98 See Glasser, 948 F.3d at 1309 (agreeing with the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of the 2015 FCC 
Order’s interpretation of the statutory definition of an ATDS on the basis that the Order’s definition 
broadens the scope of applicable devices to unacceptable levels (quoting ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 698)). 
 99 See Allan, 968 F.3d at 578–79 (illustrating the potential reach of the more expansive definition). 
The textualist argument hinges on the fact that, although smartphones do not have the innate capacity to 
use random or sequential generators either for number storage or number production, they do rely heavily 
on the ability to store telephone numbers that users import to them for later calling or texting. See id. at 
578 (summarizing the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits’ example of default smartphone technology that 
could satisfy the definition of an ATDS under the broad reading (first quoting Glasser, 948 F.3d at 
1309; and then quoting Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 467)). For the textualist, this makes the originalist  read-
ing unsustainable because it exposes personal telephonic devices to regulation under the TCPA, even 
if they were never designed to function as an ATDS for en-masse autodialing. See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d 
at 467 (noting that personal smartphone use is outside the scope of the TCPA’s purpose). The textual-
ist  argument would be far more convincing, however, if the D.C. Circuit had not previously addressed 
this issue by rejecting the idea that a device could be an ATDS if it had the capability for modification 
as such, even if it  did not have the present ability to meet the statutory definition. Allan, 968 F.3d at 
578. 
 100 See Allan, 968 F.3d at 578–79 (explaining that because the TCPA only implicates automatic 
processes, it  does not cover manual smartphone calls and texts). The FCC maintained that a device 
should meet the definition of an ATDS even if it is not currently engaged in a prohibited process, but 
nonetheless has the ability to so engage if altered or augmented (including via software). See id. at 578 
(illustrating that all smartphones have the potential for upgrades or modifications to operate as the 
type of devices the TCPA prohibits (quoting ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 696 (D.C. Cir. 2018))). The D.C. 
Circuit denied this idea in ACA International, holding that such an idea stretched the statute far be-
yond what the Legislature had intended. Id. Thus, for the originalist, if a smartphone does not current-
ly function as an ATDS, it  is not subject to the TCPA; future capabilities of the smartphone are irrele-
vant. Id. Critics of the present function argument assert that it relies too heavily on the D.C. Circuit’s 
opinion in ACA International and too blithely dismisses the ability of stock smartphone technology to 
store numbers and call them without human engagement. See id. (holding that the textualist concern 
on this issue is wholly unsubstantiated because of the D.C. Circuit’s decision on ACA International 
(quoting Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 467)). This is surprising, given how hard the originalist strategy fights 
to include storage of numbers without use of a generator into the definition of an ATDS. See Duran, 
955 F.3d at 286–87 (illustrating the originalist argument that Congress intended an expansive reading 
of the TCPA to limit certain telemarketing activities). 
 101 See Allan, 968 F.3d at 579 (focusing only on presently available technology and how current 
users deploy it). 
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available technologies properly and disregards the manner in which communi-
cations technology is likely to continue to develop. 102 
B. Possible Preemption by the Supreme Court of the United States 
The Supreme Court of the United States will soon clarify the definition of 
an ATDS under the TCPA, as the Court looks to decide Facebook, Inc. v. 
Duguid. 103 The case derives from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, which had previously held that the originalist, expansive defini-
tion of an ATDS is correct.104 If the Supreme Court holds that a strictly textualist 
reading is proper, Gadelhak could be exceptionally influential in the Court’s  
opinion, as Gadelhak focuses almost entirely on grammatical analysis.105 
CONCLUSION 
The Seventh Circuit took the safe route in Gadelhak. The court ruled that 
the correct definition of an ATDS under the TCPA derives from the purest pos-
sible grammatical reading of the language, which the court felt effectuates the 
written words and prevents statutory overreach as much as possible. Although 
                                                                                                          
 102 See id. (dismissing the seriousness of broadening the definition to certain smartphone capabili-
ties based on the phones’ current operations). 
 103 Facebook Inc. v. Duguid, SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 22.  
 104 See Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that the definition 
of an ATDS in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, L.L.C., 904 F.3d at 1052, controls). Facebook argued for a 
narrower definition, citing the slippery slope paradigm that the broad definition potentially extends to 
smartphones. Id. Facebook further argued that it  stored numbers for contact only in the event o f a  
suspected privacy or security breach. Id. To Facebook, such security protocols are reactive efforts and, 
because the TCPA defines an ATDS as equipment that generates or stores numbers to be called on 
enterprising terms, the definition does not apply to Facebook’s activities here. Id. at  1151–52. The 
court was unmoved, holding that Facebook’s distinctions did not alter the statutory definition of an 
ATDS. Id. at 1152. It is noteworthy, however, that the Ninth Circuit considered the definition within 
the context of evaluating whether Duguid’s complaint was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); it did not provide an analysis o f  th e m er its o f 
Duguid’s claim. Id.  
 105 See Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 463–64 (illustrating that the Gadelhak opinion is a precise examina-
tion of each possible interpretation according to its grammatical and syntactical merits). Notably, recent 
Supreme Court appointee and Seventh Circuit Judge Amy Coney Barrett is the author of the Gadelhak 
opinion. See id. at 460 (noting the opinion’s authorship); Amy Howe, Barrett Nomination Moves to  
Senate Floor, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/barrett-nomination-moves-to-
senate-floor/ [https://perma.cc/U5RZ-P363] (last visited Oct. 26, 2020). Given that Gadelhak repeat-
edly cited Marks as the controlling case of the Ninth Circuit on the issue, and the fact that Gadelhak 
makes no mention whatsoever of Duguid, Gadelhak provides no insight on whether the Seventh Cir-
cuit  felt  that Duguid provides any unique contributions to the circuit split worthy of consideration. See 
Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 466 (focusing only on the Marks interpretation in the Ninth Circuit). Should the 
Supreme Court uphold the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Facebook, the Supreme Court’s decision will  
preempt the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Gadelhak. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (stating that Su-
preme Court decisions preempt lower court rulings); see also Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 463–64 (demon-
strating the Seventh Circuit’s meticulous grammatical analysis in determining the TCPA definition of 
an ATDS). 
2021] The Definition of an Automatic Telephone Dialing System II.-83 
these are reasonable objectives, the holding in Gadelhak is ultimately unsatis-
fying, as it fails to engage the legitimate strengths of a more expansive defini-
tion and frustratingly limits TCPA protections to equipment that is either obso-
lete or soon will be. The court did not need to commit so strictly to textual 
analysis, particularly at the expense of finding middle ground between offering 
protection to consumers from modern robocalling systems and exposing per-
sonal smartphones to the statute. As a result, Gadelhak merely chooses a side 
and wastes the opportunity to provide fresh ideas to an issue that will soon be 
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
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